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THE DEATH PENALTY OF CIVIL CASES: THE NEED FOR 
INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT & JUDICIAL EDUCATION WHEN 
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY ILL 
INDIVIDUALS 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
The minute the ultrasound revealed that he was a boy, [I] decided to name him 
after Christopher Robin in Winnie the Pooh.  In anticipation of the birth, [I] 
bought stuffed Tiggers for the nursery, a room the young boy would[n’t] see in 
person [until years later] . . . .  [N]urses whisked Christopher out of the 
delivery room instead of laying him in [my] waiting arms . . . .  The whole 
thing didn’t happen until an hour before I was leaving the hospital. . .I had a 
car seat and everything.  I was already discharged when they said, “Sorry, he’s 
not leaving.”1 
Angela Williams’s parental rights were terminated by the Circuit Court of 
St. Francois County based almost exclusively on generalized statements about 
her Bipolar Disorder2 and a two and a half year old psychological evaluation.3  
 
 1. Susan C. Thomson, About a Boy, ST. LOUIS MAG., Oct. 2007, at 158, available at 
http://www.stlmag.com/media/St-Louis-Magazine/October-2007/About-A-Boy/. 
 2. “Bipolar I Disorder” is characterized by one or more Manic or Mixed Episodes, usually 
accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 382 (4th ed. 2000).  A Bipolar II 
Disorder is characterized as “one or more Major Depressive Episodes . . . accompanied by at least 
one Hypomanic Episode.”  Id. at 392.  In other words, “bipolar disorder” is “any of several mood 
disorders characterized usually by alternating episodes of depression and mania or by episodes of 
depression alternating with mild nonpsychotic excitement.”  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 73 (2005), available at http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm? 
book=Medical&va=bipolar+disorder.  The Mayo Clinic explains that “[t]he deep mood swings of 
bipolar disorder may last for weeks or months. . . . Today, a growing volume of research suggests 
that . . . many people aren’t correctly diagnosed [with bipolar disorder].  Left untreated, bipolar 
disorder generally worsens . . . [b]ut with effective treatment, you can live an enjoyable and 
productive life . . . .”  Mayo Clinic Staff, Bipolar Disorder Definition (2009), http://www.mayo 
clinic.com/health/bipolar-disorder/DS00356.  “[Bipolar disorder] affects approximately 5.7 
million American adults in a given year, or about 2.6% of the U.S. population age 18 and older.”  
DIANE S. ASCHENBRENNER & SAMANTHA J. VENABLE, DRUG THERAPY IN NURSING 282 (Hilarie 
Surrena et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer Health & Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins 2009) (2002).  See 
also NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER (2009), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ 
health/publications/bipolar-disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf [hereinafter BIPOLAR DISORDER]. 
 3. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 99–100 (Mo. banc 2007). 
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The Eastern District transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri,4 
which reversed and remanded, holding that an inquiry into a parent’s current 
ability to parent was necessary before allowing for termination of parental 
rights (TPR),5 and that strict compliance with statutory mandates is required 
for TPR.6  It has been nearly seven years since Angela and Christopher were 
separated.  Today, Angela visits with Christopher approximately sixteen to 
twenty hours a month in her home, plus one eight to twelve hour weekend visit 
per month.7  In order for the judge to make a competent decision, a new 
assessment of Angela’s current mental health, her current ability to parent, and 
the potential for future harm to Christopher would need to be assessed, and 
proper procedure would need to be followed. 
At this point you may be thinking: “Isn’t it common sense that a court 
needs to look to the ability of the parent at issue when deciding whether or not 
that parent can adequately care for their child?”  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s decision—which may appear to most as a commonsensical ruling—
is actually a progressive move away from railroading mentally ill parents 
through the child welfare system,8 towards requiring a more individualized 
assessment of a parent’s ability to care for their child. 
In re C.W. has far reaching implications for Missouri parents with mental 
illness and will ideally prompt more courts to discard stereotyped notions of 
individuals with disabilities as inherently incapable of being good parents.  
Angela and Christopher’s story is an all-too-common depiction of how the 
court system has failed mentally disabled individuals.  However, their story 
also gives hope, as it demonstrates that courts are demanding an inquiry into 
individual ability and are casting aside sweeping claims of inability based on 
disability. 
 
 4. In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 WL 2728583, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 5. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102. 
 6. Id. at 98. 
 7. Telephone Interview with David Orzel, Angela Williams’s Attorney (Feb. 9, 2009).  
This is substantial improvement from the visitation reported in the 2007 interview, reported in 
About a Boy stating that Angela saw Christopher for two hours a week.  Thomson, supra note 1, 
at 160. 
 8. See generally In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Walking With Them: 
Advocating for Parents with Mental Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 273, 280 (2003) (“While some substance abuse treatment programs now accept 
mothers who retain custody of their children, there do not appear to be any inpatient mental health 
treatment programs that permit mothers to enter a facility with their children.”).  Individuals with 
mental illness are not treated in their role as parents, but instead are only treated for their 
conditions.  See id. at 296–97. 
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Research shows that “the number of families headed by a parent with a 
disability has increased substantially during the past century.”9  “[M]any 
women with severe mental illness . . . wish to experience motherhood and do 
in fact give birth.”10  In fact, of the five million Americans diagnosed as 
mentally ill annually, researchers estimate that as many as one million of these 
parents have children under the age of eighteen.11  Thus, the implications of 
state decisions to terminate parental rights on the basis of mental illness are 
central to a significant segment of the American population.  As a result, it is 
vital that our court systems are educated to understand the special 
circumstances of parents with mental disabilities and to adjudicate them 
appropriately. 
Three major problems have contributed to the countless and continuing 
violations of the rights of mentally disabled individuals’ fundamental right to 
parent.12  First, the legal protections for parents with mental disabilities under 
state and federal law are insufficient.  Further, the social stigma of being a 
parent with a mental disability, generalized statistical data, age-old stereotypes, 
and horrific news stories may affect court determinations about a parent’s 
ability to raise a child based on their condition instead of their conduct.  
Finally, insufficient judicial education of family court judges may contribute to 
unequal or ineffective treatment of parents with mental disabilities in the court 
system.  As these problems demonstrate, a more informed individualized 
inquiry is required before terminating a parent’s right to his or her child, and 
judicial education is necessary to aid family court judges in weighing the 
sufficiency of evidence presented. 
 
 9. Elizabeth Lightfoot & Traci LaLiberte, The Inclusion of Disability as Grounds for 
Termination of Parental Rights in State Codes, 17 POL’Y RES. BRIEF 1 (2006) [hereinafter The 
Inclusion of Disability]. 
 10. Katherine A. Judge, Serving Children, Siblings, and Spouses: Understanding the Needs 
of Other Family Members, in HELPING FAMILIES COPE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 161, 164 (Harriet 
P. Lefley et al. eds., 1994). 
 11. JOANNE NICHOLSON ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PARENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 
AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2001), http://www.parentingwell.info/critical.pdf [hereinafter 
NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES]; see also Jung Min Park et al., Involvement in the Child Welfare 
System Among Mothers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 493, 493 (2006) 
(stating that women with psychiatric disabilities are reproducing at approximately the same rate 
as women without mental illness); see also Glennon, supra note 9, at 273 (“Yet, at least one 
million parents of children under 18, and perhaps many more, have a serious psychiatric 
disorder.”). 
 12. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.”). 
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II.  TPR: THE DEATH PENALTY OF CIVIL CASES 
Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) is the death penalty of civil cases.13  
Once a parent’s rights to his or her child are terminated, that parent’s right to 
care for, visit, or make decisions for the child are gone forever: the legal 
parent-child relationship has ended.14  The parent cannot seek a modification 
of the permanent custody order after his or her rights have been terminated.15  
The child can immediately be put up for adoption and a biological parent may 
never see their child again.16 
Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to raise and make decisions 
for their children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17  The United States Supreme Court has stated that “it is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.”18  Establishing a home and raising 
children are “among the most basic civil rights, long recognized as essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness.”19 
 
 13. See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004) (“The termination of parental 
rights has been characterized as tantamount to a ‘civil death penalty.’”); see also NICHOLSON, 
CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 10 (parents have said that when their parental rights are 
terminated, “the pain never goes away”); Joanne Nicholson et al., Focus on Women: Mothers with 
Mental Illness: I. The Competing Demands of Parenting and Living With Mental Illness, 49 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 635, 635 (1998) (“[F]ailure as a parent contributes to never-ending 
shame and humiliation.”). 
 14. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GROUNDS FOR 
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 1 (2007), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf [hereinafter 
GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TPR]. 
 15. See, e.g., In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 44–47 (Ohio 2006) (holding that a parent who 
has lost permanent custody of a child does not have standing as a non-parent to file a petition for 
custody of that child). 
 16. GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TPR, supra note 15, at 1. 
 17. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 66; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925) (“[The state’s law] unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. . . .  [R]ights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.”) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923)); see also In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 12 (“A parent’s right to raise her children 
is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the constitutional guarantee of due process.”). 
 18. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35); see also 
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (explaining rights included under the Fourteenth 
Amendment:  The Fourteenth Amendment “denotes . . . the right of the individual to . . . establish 
a home and bring up children . . .”). 
 19. Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of Happiness: Parents with Disabilities and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 LAW & INEQUALITY 153, 153 (1998).  Shade goes on to 
cite numerous examples of discrimination towards parents with disabilities including a case 
where the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s determination that a man’s 
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TPR is a clear intrusion into a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in 
raising children without state interference,20 yet caselaw and journal articles 
are littered with examples of how fear and stereotypes about the disabled have 
affected their rights to bear and parent children.21  Even Congress, in passing 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, recognized that “individuals with 
disabilities . . . have been faced with restrictions and limitations [and] 
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . based on 
characteristics that are beyond [their] control . . . resulting from stereotypic 
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to 
participate in, and contribute to, society.”22  Today, disproportionately high 
numbers of mentally ill individuals are losing their parental rights23 despite the 
fact that child abuse and neglect among mentally ill parents is low.24  Mothers 
with mental illness are “three times as likely as other mothers without serious 
 
physical handicap was a sufficient reason for awarding custody of his children to his wife who 
had not seen the children in five years.  Id. at 159 (citing In re Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979)). 
 20. See Jonathan H. v. Margaret H., 771 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (TPR is “a 
drastic intrusion into the sacred parent-child relationship.”). 
 21. The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to uphold a statute that provided for the 
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded.  See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It 
is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.”).  Justice Holmes is famous for his bold statement that “[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles are enough.”  Id.  See also Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 
16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 387–88 (2000) (“[T]he underlying belief that persons 
with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently unable to provide proper 
parenting to their children survives today.”); Shade, supra note 20, at 153 (explaining that the 
right to a family is fundamental, but has been historically “violated, abused or just ignored for 
people with disabilities”); Joanne Nicholson et al., State Policies and Programs That Address the 
Needs of Mentally Ill Mothers in the Public Sector, 44 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 484, 
484 (1993) (“Sexuality, birth control, and abortion are controversial areas in the care of chronic 
mentally ill patients, who are often thought to be unable to make decisions about their behavior, 
health care, and treatment.”). 
 22. Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).  
“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, 
despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”  § 12101(a)(2). 
 23. See The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 1 (citing a 1994-1995 National Health 
Interview Survey-Disability Supplement study stating “only 51% of parents with intellectual 
and/or developmental disabilities were currently living with their children . . .”). 
 24. Judge, supra note 11, at 164; see also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 2 
n.3 (2008) (citing Judge, supra  note 11), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/TPRpaper5-08.pdf 
[hereinafter BAZELON]; NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that the 
general public assumes that parents who have mental illness abuse or neglect their children, but 
that these high profile incidents are rare); Park, supra note 12, at 493. 
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mental illness to have come to the attention of the child welfare system or to 
have lost custody of their children.”25  In 1994, mentally ill parents made up 
twenty-two percent of parents involved in child welfare systems nationwide.26  
Reports of parents with mental illness losing their children have reached rates 
as high as seventy to eighty percent.27 
“In many states, the diagnosis of mental illness alone justifies the removal 
of children from their parents’ care, and the termination of parental rights.”28  
Missouri is one of thirty-seven states that allow termination of parental rights 
for disability-related reasons, including a parent’s mental condition or illness.29  
Many states have specifically ruled that mental disability alone is insufficient 
to interfere with the parent-child relationship, and the majority of state codes 
specify that the disability must impact the parent’s ability to care for his or her 
child, or that the court should take the parent’s condition into consideration in 
determining whether a person is unfit to parent.30 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri 
have held that “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because 
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child 
to the State.”31  Despite these rulings, studies have shown that state statutes 
improperly “emphasize disability status rather than behavior” in TPR 
proceedings.32 
 
 25. Park, supra note 12, at 496 (“[H]aving experienced a psychiatric inpatient episode . . . 
conferred a twofold higher risk of involvement in the child welfare system and a nearly threefold 
higher risk of having a child placed in out-of-home-care.”). 
 26. Glennon, supra note 11, at 277 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, NATIONAL STUDY OF PROTECTIVE, PREVENTIVE, AND REUNIFICATION 
SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1997), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/97natstudy/index.htm (now contained in U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PROFILE OF THE 1994 CHILD WELFARE POPULATION USING POINT IN 
TIME DATA, tbl. 3-10 (1997), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/97natstudy/ 
profile.htm))). 
 27. NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 10 (citing Jill G. Joseph et al., 
Characteristics and Perceived Needs of Mothers With Serious Mental Illness, 50 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1357, 1358 (1999)); see also The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 1 
(estimating that “40-60% of parents with developmental disabilities have had their children 
removed from their care at some point in time”); see also Teresa Jacobsen & Laura J. Miller, 
Focus on Women: Mentally Ill Mothers Who Have Killed: Three Cases Addressing the Issue of 
Future Parenting Capability, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 650, 650 (1998) (“60 percent of 
mothers with chronic mental illness do not raise their own children.”). 
 28. NICHOLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 12, at 43. 
 29. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 2, 7–10 (data as of August 2005). 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 
banc 2004). 
 32. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5. 
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III.  MISSOURI TPR LAW 
In Missouri, mental illness does not per se render a parent unfit or justify, 
by itself, a judicial determination of neglect or abuse.33  In order to terminate 
parental rights, a trial court must first find the existence of at least one statutory 
ground for TPR and also find that TPR is in the child’s best interest.34  
Missouri Revised Statute 211.447.5(2)(a) states that one factor the court can 
consider is the mental health of the parent: 
The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate the parental 
rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he child has been abused 
or neglected.  In determining whether to terminate parental rights pursuant to 
this subdivision, the court shall consider . . . [a] mental condition which is 
shown by competent evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the condition can be reversed and which renders the 
parent unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and 
control . . . .35 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted this statute as a three pronged 
test to terminate parental rights for a mental or emotional condition: 
1. Documentation: [Is the condition] supported by competent evidence; 
2. Duration: [Is the condition] permanent or such that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it can be reversed; and 
3. Severity of Effect: [Is the condition] so severe as to render the parent 
unable to knowingly provide the child necessary care, custody and 
control.36 
TPR statutes are “strictly construed in favor of the parent and preservation 
of the natural parent-child relationship.”37  Thus, before a state may sever 
parental rights, due process requires that a state support its allegations by at 
 
 33. See, e.g., In re A.M.F., 140 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re C.P.B., 641 
S.W.2d 456, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“Unlike neglect, abandonment, abuse, or nonsupport, the 
mental illness of a parent is not per se harmful to a child.”). 
 34. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5 (2008).  Note that the case law discusses section 211.447.4 
in connection with the juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate parental 
rights.  However, amendments to the statute have changed the section number to 211.447.5.  
(There were no substantive changes to the statutory provisions stemming from the amendments; 
only the section number changed).  See, e.g., In re E.L.B., 103 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Mo. banc 2003). 
 35. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (emphasis added); see also In re J.K., 38 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2001) (upholding termination of mother’s parental rights where the mother’s mental 
condition – Battered Women’s Syndrome – was harmful to the children and unlikely to be 
remedied in the near future). 
 36. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Mo. banc 2004).  The Court recognized that a cited 
condition of a parent must be severe enough to constitute abuse or neglect in order to TPR and 
that “[s]ome parental conduct will harm a child without constituting abuse or neglect.”  Id. at 11. 
 37. Id. at 12 (citing In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. banc 1984)). 
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least clear and convincing evidence.38  To terminate a parent’s parental rights 
due to mental illness, it must be shown that the child was harmed or is likely to 
be harmed in the future.39  Parental rights may not be severed simply because a 
child would be “better off” in another home.40  TPR in Missouri “requires a 
showing of more than merely the presence of mental or emotional instability or 
problems; the incapacity must be so severe that it renders the parent incapable 
of providing minimally acceptable care and the condition cannot be reversed or 
improved in a reasonable time.”41 
A court must look to the parent’s current ability to parent in determining 
whether or not TPR is appropriate; the court must further “determine that the 
parent is currently unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship.”42  A 
court should look to both past and present conduct in determining whether or 
not TPR is appropriate.43  A charge of abuse or neglect must be based on 
parental behavior at the time of termination, not just at the time the juvenile 
court initially took jurisdiction.44  While no actual abuse needs to occur for a 
court to grant a request for TPR,45 one or more statutory grounds under Section 
211.447 subsection 2, 3, or 4 must exist before the court may inquire into the 
best interests of the child.46 
 
 38. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982); § 211.447.6; see also In re Adoption 
of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d at 454 (“[C]lear, cogent and convincing standard of proof is met when the 
evidence ‘instantly tilt[s] the scales in the affirmative when weighted against the evidence in 
opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is 
true.’”) (quoting In re O’Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). 
 39. In re A.M.F., 140 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see also In re D.L.M., 31 
S.W.3d 64, 69–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 40. In re D.C.H., 835 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); see also Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes 
a ‘better’ decision could be made.”). 
 41. In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Mo. banc 2005). 
 42. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 20–
21 (Mo. banc 2004)) (emphasis added). 
 43. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 9–10 (“Past behavior can support grounds for termination, 
but only if it is convincingly linked to predicted future behavior.”). 
 44. Id. at 10. 
 45. See In re M.H., 859 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that a parent’s rights 
may be terminated even if there is not conclusive evidence as to how a child’s injury was caused 
– as long as the injuries occurred while the child was in parent’s custody); In re M.W.S., 160 
S.W.3d 435, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, a termination 
of parental rights under Section 211.447.4(2) does not require proof that the child has actually 
suffered abuse or neglect as a result of the parent’s mental condition.”). 
 46. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.6 (2008). 
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IV.  FOR EXAMPLE: IN RE C.W. 
In In re C.W.,47 the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Circuit Court 
of St. Francois County and held that a mother with Bipolar Disorder could not 
have her parental rights terminated without an inquiry into her current ability 
to parent.48  Angela Jean Williams gave birth to Christopher Robin Williams 
on June 19, 2003.49  Christopher was born with special needs stemming from 
his cleft palate50 and micrognathia,51 requiring him to be fed with special 
nipples and bottles.52  A neonatologist at the hospital “hotlined”53 the Missouri 
Department of Social Services, and reported that Angela “did not follow 
through with feedings. . .and [had] a significant clinical psychiatric diagnosis 
which impaired [her] ability to take care of Christopher.”54  Five days after 
Christopher’s birth, Missouri’s Children’s Division removed Christopher from 
Angela’s care, basing the removal on “concerns that [Angela] could not 
adequately care for [Christopher] given his special needs and [Angela’s] 
Bipolar Disorder and mild cerebral palsy.”55  The juvenile court judge ordered 
that Christopher be placed in foster care and required Angela to participate in 
mental health counseling to receive parenting classes.56  Further, the court 
ordered that Angela receive a psychological evaluation.57  The psychologist, 
Dr. Walker, concluded in her August 25, 2003 report that Angela was, at that 
time, “not mature enough to care for her baby”, but that Angela may be able to 
care for Christopher in the future if she “work[ed] through her issues.”58 
 
 47. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 93 (Mo. banc 2007). 
 48. Id. at 102. 
 49. Id. at 96. 
 50. “Cleft Palate” is defined as “congenital fissure of the roof of the mouth produced by 
failure of the two maxillae to unite during embryonic development and often associated with cleft 
lip.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1995). 
 51. “Micrognathia” is defined as “[a]bnormal smallness of the jaws, especially the lower jaw 
(mandible).”  ATTORNEY’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY M33 (West 1997). 
 52. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158. 
 53. A 24/7 phone center (The Children’s Division Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline) takes 
calls from individuals reporting suspected child abuse or neglect.  “Members of certain 
occupational groups, such as teachers, social workers, and physicians, are mandated by law to 
make reports to the Hotline.  Any person may report, and anonymous reports are accepted from 
individuals who are not mandated by occupation to report.”  The Missouri Dep’t of Social 
Services, Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline, http://www.dss.mo.gov/cd/can.htm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2009). 
 54. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158. 
 55. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo. banc 2007); see also In re C.W., No. ED 87800 
2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006) (“Due to Mother’s physical and 
psychological conditions, it was concluded that she could not properly care for C.W.”). 
 56. Thomson, supra note 1, at 158. 
 57. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 96. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In July 2005, the Children’s Division sought leave to file a petition for 
TPR which was granted.59  On October 17, 2005, the Children’s Division filed 
a “Termination of Parental Rights Investigation and Social Study – 211.455.3,” 
and four days later filed a petition for TPR.60  Angela filed a Motion in Limine, 
arguing that 211.455 required that the Children’s Division file a petition for 
TPR before they order an Investigation and Social Study.61  The circuit court 
overruled the motion and proceeded to trial.62 
On February 3, 2006, the circuit court entered judgment terminating 
Angela Williams’s parental rights.63  The circuit court determined that 
termination of parental rights would be in the best interest of Christopher for 
three reasons:64 (1) Angela abused and neglected Christopher;65 (2) Angela 
failed to rectify the conditions which caused the court to assume jurisdiction;66 
and (3) Angela was unfit to be a parent.67 
Missouri Revised Statute 211.447 allows for termination of parental rights 
when a child has been abused or neglected.68  Abuse or neglect can be shown 
in various ways including a failure to provide necessary care for the child, a 
severe act or recurrent acts of physical, emotional or sexual abuse, and 
chemical dependency which interferes with the parent’s ability to care for the 
 
 59. In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2006). 
 60. Id. at *2–3. 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo. banc 2007). 
 64. Id. at 99–102. 
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.4(2) (2000) (“The juvenile officer or the division may file a 
petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he child 
has been abused or neglected.”).  This section has been revised and is now section 211.447.5(2) 
(2008). 
 66. § 211.447.4(3) (2000) (allows for termination of parental rights when: “[t]he child has 
been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period of one year, and the court finds that 
the conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a 
potentially harmful nature continue to exist, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will 
be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or 
the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s prospects for early 
integration into a stable and permanent home.”).  This section has been revised and is now section 
211.447.5(3) (2008). 
 67. § 211.447.4(6) (2000) (“The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of the child’s parent when it appears that . . . [t]he parent is unfit to 
be a party to the parent and child relationship because of . . . specific conditions directly relating 
to the parent and child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration 
or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care 
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the child.”).  This section 
has been revised and is now section 211.447.5(6) (2008). 
 68. § 211.447.4(2) (2000); § 211.447.5(2) (2008). 
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child.69  However, the circuit court in C.W. found that it was Angela’s mental 
condition that rendered her unable to properly care for Christopher.70 
The circuit court relied almost exclusively upon the testimony of Dr. 
Walker and her 2003 mental health evaluation.71  Walker met with Angela 
shortly after Angela gave birth to Christopher in 2003; Walker testified at trial 
in 2006 that she had not spoken with Angela since their 2003 meeting.72  At 
the TPR hearing, Dr. Walker admitted that she was not aware of Angela’s 
current mental health status, and that the evaluation submitted to the court was 
twenty-nine months old.73  Further, Walker testified the evaluation of Angela 
was based on “generalized conclusions regarding the effects of Bipolar 
Disorder and not any specific instance of neglect by mother.”74  Despite the 
generalized testimony, the circuit court terminated Angela’s parental rights.75  
Angela appealed to the Eastern District, and the case was transferred to the 
Supreme Court of Missouri due to “the general interest and importance of the 
issues involved.”76 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI’S ANALYSIS 
On transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court’s 
decision, finding that the evidence was insufficient to terminate Angela 
Williams’s parental rights, addressing each of the trial court’s findings in 
turn.77  First, the court addressed the State’s contention that Angela abused and 
neglected Christopher.  The court noted the significance of the twenty-nine 
months between the doctor’s evaluation and trial.78  The court observed that 
Angela underwent treatment, resumed her physician-prescribed medication for 
her Bipolar Disorder, and complied with court orders to receive mental health 
counseling.79  Also during that time, Christopher had corrective surgery for his 
cleft palate, which lessened the need for “specialized feeding.”80  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri concluded that the lower court’s findings were insufficient 
to support a finding of abuse and neglect under Missouri law.81  The court 
 
 69. § 211.447.4(2) (2000); § 211.447.5(2) (2008). 
 70. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 99–100. 
 75. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99. 
 76. In re C.W., No. ED 87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2006). 
 77. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102. 
 78. Id. at 100. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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relied primarily on the fact that the State failed to prove by competent 
documented evidence that Angela’s mental condition affected her current 
ability to parent.82  Generalized conclusions about Angela’s condition and a 
two and a half year old mental health evaluation did not add up to sufficient 
evidence to TPR.83 
Next, the court addressed the lower court’s finding that Angela failed to 
rectify the conditions that caused the court to assume jurisdiction.  The lower 
court used the outdated mental health evaluation by Dr. Walker to argue that 
Angela’s mental health issues had not changed and plagued her ability to 
parent.84  The lower court noted, inter alia, that Angela had not taken her 
medication for her Bipolar Disorder for several months during 2004, that as a 
teenager her “mental health issues were out of control,” and that Angela 
“continues to deal with her mental health disorder and cerebral palsy.”85  The 
lower court held that there was little likelihood that Angela’s mental condition 
would be remedied “at an early date” to allow her to parent.86  The court noted 
that a charge of failure to rectify must be based on a determination that the 
child would be placed in a harmful situation if returned to the parent 
immediately, rather than a mere finding that the mother still had a mental 
condition.87  The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately found that because 
there was no updated expert testimony about Angela’s current mental health 
status or a prognosis for future recovery, the State failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Angela failed to rectify.88 
Finally, the court addressed the contention that Angela was unfit to be a 
parent.  The lower court based its finding that Angela was unfit on Dr. 
Walker’s two and a half year old evaluation, Angela’s admission that she 
needed help raising Christopher, and her failure to form a bond with 
Christopher after two years of visitation.89  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
noted that Dr. Walker’s dated evaluation did not establish that Angela was 
unfit, nor did the fact that Angela admitted that she needed help caring for 
 
 82. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99–100. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 100. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 100 (citing In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. banc 2004)).  
Note: a parent seeking treatment may or may not be enough to combat a charge of failure to 
rectify.  However, “[a] parent’s efforts to comply with . . . a [treatment] plan will provide the 
court with an indication of the parent’s likely efforts in the future to care for the child. . . .  A lack 
of effort to comply with a plan, or a lack of success despite effort, can predict future problems.”  
See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10. 
 88. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 100–101. 
 89. Id. at 101. 
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Christopher.90  Further, the court was not persuaded that Angela failed to form 
a bond with Christopher.91  Angela attended all of her scheduled visits with her 
son and was making efforts to bond with him.92  However, the court observed 
that “it is almost a foregone conclusion that the bond between parent and child 
will not be as strong as it otherwise would” when a child is taken from his 
mother five days after birth.93  The court encouraged other courts to “take into 
account this reality when passing judgment upon the bond between parent and 
child.”94  The court held that there was not sufficient documentation to support 
a finding that Angela Williams was an unfit parent.95 
The Supreme Court of Missouri found that without current, expert 
testimony establishing Angela’s ability to parent Christopher, there was no 
basis to assess whether services would help Angela in parenting.96  Thus, the 
finding that termination was in the best interest of Christopher was not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.97  Looking to what current 
information they had about Angela’s parenting, the court cited numerous ways 
in which Angela and Christopher’s relationship was growing.98  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, as 
the circuit court failed to establish a ground for termination and the petition for 
TPR should have been filed before the investigation and social study.99 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
Unfortunately, decisions like the circuit court’s decision in In re C.W. are 
not uncommon, but are illustrative of a nationwide epidemic of courts allowing 
stereotypes to inform their decisions.100  An individual’s mental condition 
often clouds a court’s judgment and shifts the focus from the parent’s current 
ability to parent.101  This is not a new problem: researchers and authors have 
recognized that mentally disabled individuals have been discriminated against 
and stereotyped for decades.102  We are aware of the problem – so why are 
courts still treating parents with mental disabilities differently? 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 101. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 102. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10. 
 101. Id. at 4. 
 102. See Shade, supra note 20; Kerr, supra note 22. 
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A. The Legal Protections for Parents with Mental Illness are Insufficient 
Although there are protections for parents with mental disabilities under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),103 Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act,104 the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA),105 and the 
14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause,106 rarely do parents raise such 
protections in TPR proceedings.107  Instead of using federal protections in TPR 
proceedings, parents generally rely solely upon state statutes, as “ADA and 
constitutional claims. . .generally do not add anything to state law arguments 
raised in such situations.”108  Unfortunately, however, state law does not 
provide adequate protections for mentally disabled parents either. 
1. TPR Statutes Contain Unclear, Outdated Language and Do Not 
Sufficiently Define Statutory Terminology 
A University of Minnesota study analyzing state TPR statues found that 
“many states include disability inappropriately in their TPR statutes, including 
using inappropriate, outdated terminology to refer to a person’s disability, 
using imprecise definitions of disability, and often focusing on disability rather 
than behavior.”109 
Mental illness is an “ambiguous concept. . .which proves difficult to define 
or quantify.”110  However, “mental illness,” the condition most commonly 
 
 103. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994). 
 104. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
 105. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C.A. § 629 (2003). 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 107. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3–4 n.5.  For example, Title II of the ADA protects disabled 
parents’ right to participate in public programs, services, and activities.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(1994).  Parents with mental disabilities often require such services to assist them in keeping 
custody of their children.  Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3.  Unfortunately, many courts have found 
that the ADA cannot be raised as a defense in TPR proceedings because: (1) the court finds that 
TPR proceedings are not a “service, program, or activity” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the 
court finds that their jurisdiction is limited to state child welfare law rather than “an open ended 
inquiry into how the parents might respond to alternative . . . services and why those services 
have not been provided,” In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 721 (Vt. 1997), or (3) the court finds that Title 
II provides an affirmative action, not a defense.  Bazelon, supra note 25, at 4.  Even those courts 
that do allow for ADA claims in TPR proceedings generally do not find ADA violations.  Id. at 
4–5.  See also Glennon, supra note 9, at 275 (“Almost all state courts to consider the question 
have ruled that an agency’s failure to adhere to the ADA cannot be asserted as a defense to a 
termination of parental rights proceeding.”). 
 108. Bazelon, supra note 25, at 3 n.5; see also The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5 
(stating that many state appellate courts have held the ADA inapplicable to TPR proceedings 
because TPR is not a “public service, program, or activity” as defined by the ADA or because 
TPR is based on the child’s welfare, not the parent’s). 
 109. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 5. 
 110. Harvard Law Review Association, Sixth Amendment: Competency Standard for Self-
Representation at Trial, 122 HARV. L. REV. 316, 323 (2008). 
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included in state TPR statutes, is often left undefined or given an extremely 
broad definition.111  Mental illness has been defined as a “brain disorder that 
disrupts an individual’s ability to think, feel, and relate to others and their 
environment,”112 though the diverse population of individuals with mental 
illness makes the concept difficult to generalize.113 
Missouri state statute allows for termination of parental rights for reasons 
of mental conditions, but does not define what constitutes a “mental 
condition.”114  “Mental condition” can imply either a mental illness or an 
intellectual/developmental disability.115  Because “mental condition” is 
undefined, a court can interpret it as broadly or loosely as it wants.116  Section 
211.447 of the Missouri Revised Statutes attempts to clarify, stating that in 
order for a mental disability to allow for termination of parental rights, “more 
than merely the presence of mental or emotional instability or problems [must 
be shown]; the incapacity must be so severe that it renders the parent incapable 
of providing minimally acceptable care and the condition cannot be reversed or 
improved in a reasonable time.”117 
Under Missouri law, a judge must first find a statutory ground for 
termination (e.g. “mental condition”) before subjectively looking to the best 
interest of the child.118  Because Missouri statute leaves judges with discretion 
to interpret “mental condition,” judges are able to exercise discretion in finding 
the statutory ground and in analyzing the child’s best interests.  While judicial 
discretion is a vital part of the American court system, the judicial discretion in 
interpreting “mental condition” essentially allows the judge to circumvent the 
law.  In theory, the judge could consider the child’s best interests in 
conjunction with finding a statutory ground for termination (instead of finding 
a statutory ground first and then considering “best interests” separately, as 
 
 111. The Inclusion of Disability, supra note 10, at 3. 
 112. Krista A. Gallager, Parents in Distress: A State’s Duty to Provide Reunification Services 
to Mentally Ill Parents, FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 234, 235 (2000) (quoting National 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, What is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, http://www.nami.org/ 
Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Mental_Illness/About_Mental_Illness.htm 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009)). Note also that Department of Justice regulations under Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act has specifically enumerated “mental illness” as a “mental 
impairment” for purposes of proving disability under the Act.  28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B) 
(2008). 
 113. RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 1 (2009). 
 114. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (2008); see also Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra 
note 10, at 8. 
 115. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 3. 
 116. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880) (“It is the province of the courts to 
decide causes between parties, and, in so doing, to construe the Constitution and the statutes of 
the United States. . . .”). 
 117. In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Mo. banc 2005). 
 118. § 211.447.6. 
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required by law).  Unfortunately, societal prejudices exist in judges too.119  
Allowing for discretion in both parts of the TPR analysis can lead to 
inconsistent results and allow judges to predetermine the outcome of cases. 
Some disability advocacy groups like the Disability and Parental Rights 
Legislative Change Project (The Project) argue that disability language should 
be removed from TPR statutes entirely.120  The Project seeks to “ensure fair 
treatment of parents or guardians with disabilities in child custody and child 
protection cases, while promoting the safety, stability, and well being of their 
children.”121  In order to achieve their goal, The Project urges states to 
explicitly affirm that their TPR statutes are not to be construed to allow 
discrimination on the basis of disability.122  Further, The Project would require 
that courts focus on parental behavior and not the parent’s disability.123  
However, assuming that the thirty-seven states that currently include disability 
language in their statutes124 do not remove the language entirely, a surefire way 
to promote just outcomes in TPR cases is to demand a case-by-case analysis of 
each parent’s current and future ability to parent without specifically focusing 
on the parent’s mental condition. 
Many parents fail to fit the ideal image of what society thinks a parent 
should be.  The law acknowledges that parents are not perfect and states that 
parental rights may not be severed simply because a child would be “better 
off” in another home;125 statutes are to be strictly construed to preserve the 
parent-child relationship.126  Some state courts have gone so far as to hold that 
“even where the parent-child relationship is ‘marginal,’ it is usually in the best 
interests of the child to remain at home and still benefit from a family 
environment.”127  Research shows that most criteria courts use in terminating 
 
 119. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, Recognizing Our Dangerous Gifts: Applying the Social 
Model to Individuals with Mental Illness, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 141, 159 (2008) (“A 
psychiatric label also has serious implications in family law, especially in child custody 
proceedings and the best-interests of the child standards that are used therein. . . .  [A] parent who 
has been given a psychiatric label would benefit from the judge’s education on the many forms of 
treatment that may be successfully used in order to cope with mental illness . . . .”). 
 120. E. LIGHTFOOT ET AL., GUIDE FOR CREATIVE LEGISLATIVE CHANGE: DISABILITY 
STATUS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY STATUTES 1 
(2007). 
 121. Id. at 3. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 4. 
 124. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 2. 
 125. In re D.C.H., 835 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 72–73 (2000). 
 126. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004) (citing In re W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 
455 (Mo. banc 1984)). 
 127. Glennon, supra note 9, at 294 (citing In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn. 
1983)). 
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parental rights focuses on past and current parental behavior.128  However, 
when courts focus on the parent’s mental condition, the court is looking to 
“contributing factors[s] of the parent’s behavior rather than the parent’s 
behavior itself.”129  The inclusion of mental illness or mental conditions in 
TPR statutes tends to shift the focus of the proceeding from the individual 
parent’s conduct to the parent’s generic mental condition.130 
As demonstrated in the circuit court’s decision in In re C.W., undefined 
statutory terms lead courts to focus the parent’s condition rather than conduct 
and lead to inconsistent and unjust results in TPR proceedings.  Although 
further legislative clarification limiting judicial discretion (or removing 
disability language) is ideal, at the very least it is imperative that courts make 
individual assessments of each parent’s individual ability to care for his or her 
child. 
2. TPR Law Fails to Provide Standards Regarding the Nature of Evidence 
Required in a TPR Proceeding 
Missouri does not have statutory guidelines to help courts in determining 
what kind of evidence must be presented to prove that a “mental condition” is 
severe enough to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child.  The State must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a mental condition exists,131 
though expert testimony is not statutorily required.  Does the State need an 
expert to testify to the “mental condition” of the parent?  If so, who qualifies as 
an expert?  A psychiatrist?  A psychologist?  A social worker?  And how long 
does the expert have to interact with the parent to assess his or her ability to 
parent?  A year?  A day?  An hour?  Further, what are “minimally acceptable” 
standards of care?  Does that mean that the child just needs food, shelter, and 
clothing?  Or does it mean that the parent must maintain a healthy relationship 
with the child?  If so, what does a “healthy relationship” mean? 
Statutes and procedures providing for termination of parental rights must 
not be vague.132  Missouri’s legislature, however, has left countless questions 
unanswered, leaving courts with excessive discretion in determining that a 
parent has a mental condition which renders them unable to provide for the 
care, custody, or control of the child. 
The statutory vagueness in many TPR statutes is dangerous.  It leaves 
courts with vast discretion to determine how much evidence is “enough” to 
inflict the death penalty of civil cases and permanently sever the rights of a 
 
 128. Lightfoot & LaLiberte, supra note 10, at 4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. MO. REV. STAT. § 211-447.6 (2008). 
 132. Rosemary Shaw Sackett, Terminating Parental Rights of the Handicapped, 25 FAM. 
L.Q. 253, 260 (1991). 
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parent to their child.  Such discretion is inappropriately left in the hands of a 
judge who likely has no specific knowledge about the condition at issue or its 
ability to be effectively medically treated, and can lead a court to improperly 
deem a parent to have a “mental condition” that inhibits their ability to parent.  
Unless courts demand more specific evidentiary criteria to be met when 
deciding to terminate a parent’s rights due to a mental condition, the danger of 
elevating condition over individual behavior in TPR proceedings will continue. 
In C.W., the circuit court cited Angela’s condition and past effects of her 
condition as a reason for terminating her parental rights.133  The court changed 
the lives of Angela and her son, admittedly based on what the “expert,” Dr. 
Walker, described as “generalized conclusions regarding the effects of Bipolar 
Disorder and not any specific instance of neglect by [Angela].”134  Had the 
court taken a closer look at Angela Williams as an individual, as opposed to 
looking solely to her “condition,” they would have found that Angela had 
sought and received treatment and medication for her Bipolar Disorder.135  
Additionally, Christopher’s needs were no longer as demanding, as he 
underwent surgery for his cleft palate.136  Angela had complied with court 
orders requiring her to receive mental health counseling137 and was taking all 
of the right steps to prove herself as a capable parent. 
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately got it right, the circuit 
court’s focus on Angela’s condition rather than her behavior changed the lives 
of Angela and her son forever and cost them both precious years of their lives 
together.  Shifting the analysis to an individualized assessment and requiring 
more or different evidence of Angela’s ability to parent could have prevented 
many years of disruption and heartache for the Williams family. 
B. The “Best Interest of the Child” Analysis should be Based on the 
Individual Circumstances of Each Family 
An essential consideration of any court in a TPR proceeding is whether the 
conduct of the parent that has brought them under the court’s jurisdiction has 
had or will have a negative effect on the child.138  If a court determines by clear 
and convincing evidence that a parent has a statutory “mental condition” that is 
either “permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
condition can be reversed” and that the condition “renders the parent unable to 
 
 133. In re C.W., No. ED87800, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2006) (“Due to Mother’s physical and psychological conditions, it was concluded that she could 
not properly care for C.W.”). 
 134. In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 99–100. 
 135. Id. at 100. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Mo. banc 2004). 
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knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control,”139 the 
door is open for the court to consider the best interests of the child.140  The 
“best interest” analysis is a subjective analysis based on the totality of the 
circumstances, allowing for a fair amount of judicial discretion.141 
The mental health statuses of a parent and her child are intimately 
connected.142  Research shows that children raised by parents with serious 
mental illness have a higher risk of developing mental illness than children 
raised by parents without mental illness.143  The risk of a child developing a 
mental illness is heightened when a parent has Bipolar Disorder,144 an anxiety 
disorder,145 Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),146 
schizophrenia,147 alcoholism148 or other drug abuse, or depression.149, 150  Being 
raised by a parent with mental illness can create a stressful environment for the 
 
 139. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(2)(a) (2008). 
 140. See § 211.447.6. 
 141. In re A.A.T.N., 181 S.W.3d 161, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 142. Carol M. Anderson et al., Why Lower Income Mothers Do Not Engage With the Formal 
Mental Health Care System: Perceived Barriers to Care, 16 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 926, 
926 (2006). 
 143. Judge, supra note 11, at 164. 
 144. “Bipolar I Disorder” is characterized by one or more Manic or Mixed Episodes, usually 
accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.”  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra 
note 2, at 382. 
 145. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 225 (3d ed. 1980). 
In this group of disorders, anxiety is either the predominant disturbance, as in a Panic 
Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, or anxiety is experienced if the individual 
attempts to master the symptoms, as in confronting the dreaded object or situation in a 
Phobic Disorder or resisting the obsessions or compulsions in Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder.  Diagnosis of an anxiety disorder is not made if the anxiety is due to another 
disorder such as Schizophrenia, an Affective Disorder, or an Organic Mental Disorder. 
Id. 
 146. The essential features of ADHD are developmentally-inappropriate inattention and/or 
hyperactivity-impulsivity.  Id. at 41. 
 147. Schizophrenic disorders feature “the presence of certain psychotic features during the 
active phase of the illness, characteristic symptoms involving multiple psychological processes, 
deterioration from a previous level of functioning, onset before age 45, and a duration of at least 
six months.”  Id. at 181. 
 148. “The essential feature of Alcohol Abuse is a pattern of pathological use for at least a 
month that causes impairment in social or occupational functioning.”  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 146, at 169. 
 149. Diagnostic criteria for major depression includes (a) one or more depressive episodes 
and (b) no occurrence of a manic episode or hypomanic episode. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 369. 
 150. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, AACAP FACTS FOR FAMILIES 
NO. 39: CHILDREN OF PARENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.aa 
cap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/39_children_of_parents_with_mental_illness.pdf. 
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child and can cause the child to have adjustment and/or developmental 
problems.151  Additionally, because of the social stigma associated with mental 
illness, parents often choose to forego treatment to avoid having their parenting 
abilities scrutinized.152 
Despite the increased risks associated with having a parent with a mental 
illness, the majority of children raised by parents with mental illness will never 
develop the psychiatric disorder of their parents.153  In fact, research has 
suggested that children are at heightened risk for psychopathology when taken 
from their parents and put into foster care.154  Long-term separation from a 
parent can result in a negative impact on the well-being and functioning of 
both children and parents.155  Thus, removing a child from his or her parent – 
in some situations – can ultimately cause more harm than good. 
Although research shows increased risk to children in certain scenarios, 
substantial empirical evidence has shown that mental illness affects every 
parent in a unique way, as every parent’s situation is different.156  Thus, it is 
essential that every situation be individually scrutinized when determining 
whether ending the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child.  
Even though Bipolar Disorder may cause sporadic shifts in Angela Williams’s 
mood, energy, and ability to function, with proper treatment and services 
Angela can control the symptoms, lead a normal life, and raise a family.157  
The stigma of mental illness puts mentally ill parents at a severe disadvantage 
in TPR cases, despite the fact that many individuals who have a mental illness 
are able to lead productive and healthy lifestyles.158 
Another stereotype that parents with mental illness are constantly 
combating is that mentally ill individuals are inherently dangerous.159  Highly 
publicized, sensationalized news stories of mentally ill parents abusing or 
killing their children fuel the public’s perception that mentally ill individuals 
 
 151. Judge, supra note 11, at 164 (citing Marian Radke-Yarrow et al., Young Children of 
Affectively Ill Parents: A Longitudinal Study of Psychosocial Development, 31 J. AM. ACAD. 
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 68, 68–77 (1992)). 
 152. Glennon, supra note 9, at 293. 
 153. Judge, supra note 11, at 164. 
 154. Jacobsen & Miller, supra note 28, at 650. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 650–51 (citing APFEL & HANDEL, MADNESS AND LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD: 
SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG-TERM MENTAL ILLNESS (1993)); J. BOWLBY, A 
SECURE BASE: CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT THEORY (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1988); FA Rogosch et al., Determinants of Parenting Attitudes in Mothers with Severe 
Psychopathology, 4 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 469 (1992)). 
 157. See generally BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 2, at 1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Gallager, supra note 113, at 239.  See also Glennon, supra note 9, at 292 (stating that 
studies showed that mental illness “continued to carry a social stigma, and was perceived to be 
linked to violent behavior”). 
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are unfit parents.160  However, “the vast majority of mentally ill individuals are 
not more dangerous than others in the general population.”161  As a result of 
this misplaced fear, parents with mental illness have difficulty convincing child 
welfare caseworkers that they are able to be good parents.162  Negative 
perceptions about the mentally ill may blind caseworkers, causing the focus to 
shift from preservation of the parent-child relationship to termination of 
parental rights.163  The child welfare system as a whole has moved its focus 
“away from preserving the biological family to providing children safety and 
‘permanent’ adoptive families, despite the human cost of disrupting the child’s 
original family.”164 
It is important for courts to recognize published research that clearly 
disproves stereotypes about the “certain danger” that parents with mental 
illness pose to their children.  By ridding the courts of bias through education, 
parents with mental illness have a better chance at being seen as individuals 
instead of stereotypes. 
C. Judicial Education on Mental Illness Will Help Judges Interpret the Best 
Interests Standard 
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 15.05(g) states that “[e]ach judge of the 
family court division . . . shall complete . . . a course of training in family law 
accredited by this Court’s judicial education committee . . . .  Each year 
thereafter, such judges . . . shall complete at least six hours of continuing legal 
education courses . . . relating to family court issues and law.”165  As of this 
writing, however, there are no specific requirements that judges be educated 
about mental health issues or how to appropriately adjudicate cases involving 
individuals with mental illness. 
 
 160. Gallager, supra note 113, at 234.  See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother 
Who Drowned Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A23; Angela K. Brown, Psychiatrist 
Says Yates Was Psychotic, WASH. POST ONLINE, June 29, 2006, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR200606062900411.html (last visited Feb. 9, 
2009). 
 161. Gallager, supra note 113, at 239 (quoting HARRIET P. LEFLEY, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN 
MENTAL ILLNESS 72 (Diane S. Foster ed., 1996)). 
 162. Glennon, supra note 9, at 291–92 (“These attitudes may make child welfare caseworkers 
less likely to take steps to preserve or reunify families where parents have mental illnesses.  Most 
damaging to parents involve in the child welfare system is the deeply embedded belief that 
individuals with mental illnesses are unpredictable and dangerous.”). 
 163. Id. at 274 (“Child welfare services are often ill-suited to the needs of parents with mental 
illnesses, and their cases are managed by child welfare workers with little understanding of 
mental illness . . . . Moreover, many child welfare caseworkers often have excessive caseloads 
and few effective services to which to refer families.”). 
 164. Id. at 277. 
 165. MO. SUP. CT. R. 15.05(g) (2005). 
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Scholars have deemed judicial education regarding mental health issues 
and the efficacy of alternative treatment programs as “haphazard.”166  Judicial 
education on mental health often consists of a judge “absorbing expertise” 
from information presented in court.167  This type of on-the-job training is 
dangerous, as it does not ensure that judges are aware of the most recent, 
highest quality data and may lead to inconsistent treatment of parents with 
mental disabilities.168 
Some Missouri courts have recognized the need for more specialized 
education for judges dealing with mentally ill individuals.  As of April 2003, 
five counties in Missouri have Mental Health Court Divisions.169  The focus of 
Mental Health Court has been on “root causes that contribute to criminal 
involvement of persons in the criminal justice population.”170  The criminal 
courts in Missouri have recognized that individuals with mental disabilities 
have unique needs in the justice system.171  Thus, judges in Mental Health 
Courts receive training on mental health issues of criminal offenders and take 
an active, therapeutically oriented role in their treatment.172  Unfortunately, this 
trend towards focusing on special needs of the mentally disabled has not 
extended to family courts and, in Missouri, is available only in criminal courts. 
Currently in Missouri there are minimal standards for judges in 
determining a parent has a mental condition.  No expert is statutorily required 
to come into court to prove a mental condition.  A social worker fresh out of 
college, having had little or no special training in mental illness, is often the 
individual doing the investigation and social study of the mentally ill parent.173  
Judges may be given incomplete or incorrect information at trial.  While 
scholars advocate that case workers in the child welfare system must be 
 
 166. See, e.g., Jessie B. Gunther, Reflections on the Challenging Proliferation of Mental 
Health Issues in the District Court and the Need for Judicial Education, 57 ME. L. REV. 541, 549 
(2005). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 550. 
 169. Your Missouri Courts, Mental Health Court Divisions, http://www.courts.mo.gov/page. 
jsp?id=310 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (including St. Louis City Municipal Court, Jackson 
County, St. Louis County, Greene County, and Boone County). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY 
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, 
SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE 66 (Apr. 2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/ 
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 173. In re C.W., No. ED 87800 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1430, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2006) (stating that Lindsay Ulen, a recent social work graduate, was assigned to Angela and 
Christopher’s case). 
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educated about the mental illness, its treatment, recovery, and support 
services,174 judicial education should also be increased to assist judges in 
weighing evidence presented in court. 
General continuing legal education (CLE) is required for judges, though 
there are no specific requirements for training on mental illness.175  Two 
national organizations, the National Judicial College176 (NJC) and the National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges177 (NCJFCJ) sponsor training 
programs for judges, as do many state programs.  The NJC offers judicial 
education programs focusing on managing cases involving individuals with 
mental disabilities in an attempt to help judges “identify and assess individuals 
with mental health disorders and employ judicial strategies to address them 
effectively.”178  As of this writing, the NCJFCJ does not have any trainings or 
conferences relating to mental illness scheduled (though traditionally “hot 
topics” like drug court and domestic violence are addressed).179  Unfortunately, 
mental health education is often overlooked,180 and Missouri judges are not 
required to participate specifically in CLEs focusing on mental health issues. 
As TPR is the most extreme of civil judgments for a parent and child, 
judicial education must be correspondingly extreme.  Some states require that 
judges complete specific education courses for handling capital cases 
immediately upon being seated on the criminal bench.181  These courses are 
required before a judge can hear a capital case.182  Further, judges are required 
to take follow up CLE “refresher” courses to stay up to date on death penalty 
happenings.183  Trial judges should be required to participate in similar training 
regarding mental illness and termination of parental rights before they can 
preside over a TPR proceeding. 
Judicial education about mentally ill conditions and effectiveness of 
treatment is necessary to prevent inconsistent treatment and to promote 
confidence in the outcomes of TPR proceedings.184  Although judges are 
generally expected to be neutral arbiters, some juvenile cases give the court an 
 
 174. Glennon, supra note 9, at 298. 
 175. MO. SUP. CT. R. 15.05(g) (2005). 
 176. The National Judicial College, Managing Cases Involving Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, http:///www.judges.org/planned_2009.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 177. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Training and Conferences, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/267/315/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
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 180. See Gunther, supra note 167, at 549. 
 181. FL. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215(b)(10)(A) (2009). 
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affirmative duty to enter a decree that is in the best interests of the children.185  
While judges must ultimately defer to available expert evidence,186 requiring 
judicial education on mental illness can assist trial court judges in weighing 
expert testimony’s credibility and ultimately guide the court to a situation that 
is truly in the best interest of the child. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Individuals with mental illness are still people; they are not faceless 
statistics, but are mothers, fathers, friends, and lovers.187  Individuals with 
mental illness are able to hold jobs, take care of responsibilities, and maintain a 
quote “normal” existence.188  Most mental illnesses, including Bipolar 
Disorder, are treatable.189  However, stereotypes and stigma rear their ugly 
heads when individuals with mental illness decide to become parents. 
Currently, legal protections for parents with mental illness are insufficient 
under both state and federal law.190  Fortunately, inconsistent results in TPR 
cases can be avoided.  Simply by using more precise terminology in statutes, 
increasing statutory guidance and limiting judicial discretion in interpreting 
“mental condition,” and calling for legislative elaboration regarding 
evidentiary requirements necessary to prove duration and severity of mental 
conditions, will enable trial court judges to look specifically to the parent’s 
ability to care for their child rather than that parent’s generic condition. 
In order to ensure that judges consider individual circumstances of each 
family in TPR cases, it is essential that courts are aware of the risks and non-
risks of children raised by parents with mental illness.  In many cases, benefits 
of being raised by a parent outweigh the risks to the child stemming from 
mental illness.  Courts need to understand the research disproving stereotyped 
notions of inherently “dangerous” mentally ill parents and acknowledge that 
mentally ill individuals can lead healthy, productive lives.  Finally, because 
insufficient judicial education of family court judges may contribute to unequal 
or ineffective treatment of parents with mental disabilities in the court system, 
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 187. See generally BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 2, at 1. 
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the need for judicial education on mental health issues is necessary to aid 
family court judges in weighing the sufficiency of evidence presented. 
The decision in In re C.W. marked the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
commitment to casting the decades of stigma aside and assessing each parent’s 
individual ability to provide for the care, custody, and control of their child.191  
Unfortunately, Angela Williams has had to wait far too long to be treated like 
an individual.  The circuit court failed to look at Angela as a parent, and 
instead regarded her as a condition or disorder.192  The circuit court relied on 
appallingly outdated, generalized statements about Bipolar Disorder in an 
effort to permanently sever the relationship between Angela and her son.193  
Perhaps if the trial judge had been exposed to the literature regarding the 
reasons that an individualized assessment is necessary and appropriate and/or 
evidence of the effectiveness of treatment for Bipolar disorder, Angela and 
Christopher may not have been separated for nearly seven years.194 
In the fall of 2009, Angela entered into an out-of-court agreement with 
Christopher’s foster family, granting the foster family guardianship over 
Christopher.195  Pursuant to the agreement, Angela enjoys unsupervised 
weekday visits with Christopher for approximately sixteen to twenty hours per 
month, plus one eight to twelve hour weekend visit per month.196  Angela 
receives mental health assessments quarterly, and continues to work to manage 
her Bipolar Disorder.197  The guardianship agreement leaves the door open for 
Angela to seek full parental rights in the future.198 
Though nearly seven years of foster care and a rollercoaster ride through 
the court system have made it difficult,199 Angela continues to work to build a 
bond with her son.  While the juvenile court still monitors both Angela and 
Christopher’s guardians, hopes are high that the family court will release 
jurisdiction in 2010.200  Judicial education paired with the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s demand for individualized assessments will ideally serve to prevent 
 
 191. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d at 102 (remanding the circuit court’s decision to terminate 
parental rights based on outdated expert testimony and improper procedure). 
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this kind of drawn-out family disruption and to ensure fair process in future 
TPR cases. 
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